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MY FIRST SUPREME COURT ARGUMENT . . .  
AND THEN WHAT HAPPENED 
Adam G. Unikowsky* 
My first Supreme Court argument was in Puerto Rico v. 
Sánchez Valle.1 The case concerned the dual-sovereignty 
exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause. As every schoolkid 
learns, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents criminal defendants 
from being tried twice for the same crime. As not every 
schoolkid learns, that rule does not apply when the successive 
prosecutions are by different sovereigns. The Supreme Court has 
held that states are different sovereigns from the federal 
government—which means that if a person’s conduct violates 
both federal and state law, he can be separately tried and 
sentenced in both federal and state court.2 In Sánchez Valle, the 
question presented was whether Puerto Rico—a U.S. territory—
was a different sovereign from the United States, such that 
successive prosecutions by the federal government and Puerto 
Rico for the same conduct did not violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.
I could not have asked for a better first Supreme Court 
case. Sánchez Valle presented a profound question of 
constitutional law: What constitutes a sovereign? It required a 
deep dive into history that included, for instance, comparing the 
creation of the Puerto Rico Constitution with the events 
surrounding the states’ entrance into the union. It was both 
symbolically important and of practical importance to the 
                                                          
*Adam G. Unikowsky, a partner in the Litigation Department at Jenner & Block, is also a 
member of the firm’s Appellate and Supreme Court, Communications, and Technology 
Litigation Practices. He has won seven cases in the Supreme Court. 
1. ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) (argued January 13, 2016). 
2. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1867, 1870 (explaining that “two prosecutions . . . are 
not for the same offense if brought by different sovereigns—even when those actions target 
the identical criminal conduct through equivalent criminal laws” because the defendant has 
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administration of justice. And, of course, the case was of the 
greatest practical importance to my two clients, who faced years 
of additional imprisonment if Puerto Rico was permitted to 
prosecute them for crimes for which they had already served 
time. It was an incredible privilege to litigate the case in the 
Supreme Court. 
Predictably, I prepared obsessively for the oral argument, 
doing three moot courts and spending most of my waking hours 
figuring out how I would respond to off-the-wall questions. The 
oral argument itself was a blur. I got out my first line—“Under 
the Constitution, states are sovereign, but territories are not”—
which in retrospect might have been a bit trite. I got out a few 
more words and then the questions began. As in many a 
Supreme Court argument, my experience consisted of listening 
nervously to often lengthy questions that I wasn’t sure I 
understood; stammering out a few words in response; and then 
being interrupted with another lengthy question. My fifteen 
minutes went by very quickly, but I sat down thinking that I 
hadn’t affirmatively lost the case for my clients. In the end the 
Court went our way by a six-to-two vote. 
I very much doubt that my oral argument made an 
impression on the Justices, but it certainly made an impression 
on me. Of course I wanted to go up there again. I began reading 
reported decisions to try to find one that might interest the 
Supreme Court, and I got lucky. Three lawyers agreed to let me 
file petitions for certiorari challenging adverse decisions. By a 
quirk of scheduling, the three petitions were scheduled for 
Conference in rapid succession, and then the Supreme Court 
granted all three. This meant that I would be arguing three 
Supreme Court cases in the span of a month. Uh-oh. 
The next few months were busy. Preparing opening and 
reply briefs in three cases takes time. Of course, I had work for 
other clients that I couldn’t leave by the wayside. And all was 
not quiet on the home front, with two young kids who were not 
interested in my litigation calendar and our third child due two 
weeks after the third oral argument. 
But as I prepared the briefs, I realized that I was even 
luckier than I thought. I had stumbled onto three cases in which 
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I have always found it unseemly for lawyers to take too 
much credit for Supreme Court wins. Supreme Court litigation is 
not a moot court competition. The Supreme Court rules for the 
better case, not the better lawyer. And for good reason—the 
whole premise of the certiorari process is that the Court takes 
cases that are important to the country, not just to the litigants. 
Indeed, it is customary for cert petitions to characterize cases as 
good vehicles for resolving broader issues that affect other 
litigants. So it would seem unfair to have those others lose their 
rights because someone else—the person who took the issue to 
the Supreme Court first—hired a bad lawyer. Of course having a 
good lawyer helps convince the Court about the strength of a 
case, but the Justices really do try their best to look past the 
quality of the lawyering and get to the right answer. 
This makes Supreme Court litigation particularly rewarding 
when you are lucky enough to stumble across a winning case. 
And I was lucky, cubed. I had stumbled across three winning 
cases. 
The first case, Howell v. Howell,3 was a military divorce 
dispute in which I represented a veteran against his ex-wife. 
Federal law provides that a veteran can get a pension or 
disability pay, but not both; if a veteran starts receiving 
disability pay, he waives a corresponding portion of his pension. 
Federal law also provides that a divorce court can divide a 
veteran’s pension, but not disability pay. A divorce court had 
divided Mr. Howell’s pension, and he later waived a portion of 
his pension to receive disability pay. The divorce court then 
ordered him to pay his ex-wife an amount that would ensure that 
she was getting the same monthly amount that she had received 
when he was paying her solely out of his pension. When you 
work through the math, you realize that this order is dollar-for-
dollar identical to an order dividing Mr. Howell’s disability pay, 
which is prohibited under federal law. Yet the Supreme Court of 
Arizona nonetheless held that the order did not violate federal 
law. This just couldn’t be right. 
The second case, Honeycutt v. United States,4 concerned 
whether co-conspirators are jointly and severally liable for 
forfeiture orders when only one conspirator actually got the 
                                                          
3. ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017) (argued March 20, 2017). 
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money. Nothing in the federal statute at issue provided for joint 
and several liability. Indeed, the statute was clearly directed at 
ensuring the forfeiture of tainted property directly implicated in 
crime—which is inconsistent with imposing forfeiture orders on 
co-conspirators who never received tainted property. 
The third case, Kokesh v. SEC,5 concerned whether there 
was a statute of limitations for the SEC’s implied disgorgement 
remedy. Disgorgement is an implied remedy, so, not 
surprisingly, there is no express statute of limitations. An old 
statute provided a general five-year statute of limitations that 
applied in actions for penalties or forfeitures, so the question 
was whether disgorgement fell into either category. The SEC 
took the position that disgorgement was neither a penalty nor a 
forfeiture, so there was no statute of limitations whatsoever. Of 
course, the reason Congress hadn’t enacted a statute of 
limitations was that disgorgement was an implied remedy. So 
the SEC’s position boiled down to the theory that not only could 
the government create implied remedies, but it could ensure that 
those remedies were subject to no limitations period precisely 
because they are implied. I did not think the Supreme Court 
would go for that. 
So I felt good about my cases. Well, not that good. I was up 
against the government in all three cases—in Honeywell and 
Kokesh, the government was the opposing party—and in 
Howell, the government had filed an amicus brief on the ex-
spouse’s side. In all three cases, not only the courts below, but 
also most other courts, had ruled against my position. In 
Honeycutt, the one case in which I truly felt certain that the 
government’s position was wrong, there was actually a nine-to-
one circuit split in the government’s favor. I was worried that 
my assessment of our positions reflected unconscious hubris. 
(Consciously, at least, I was extremely nervous.) I was also 
aware that lawyers routinely insist publicly, and believe 
privately, that they’re going to win, only to be shocked by the 
outrageous decisions against them. I didn’t want to be one of 
those lawyers. 
But it worked out. The oral arguments were a bit 
anticlimactic, which was a good thing. In Howell I sat down 
with something like thirteen minutes left, having gotten only a 
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few polite questions from the bench. In Honeycutt I don’t think I 
got a single hostile question, and sat down fifteen minutes early. 
My primary regret in both cases is that I droned on too long in 
rebuttal. The bench was more active in Kokesh, but the Justices 
were much harder on my opponent. In the end, the Court ruled 
for my clients in all three cases without dissent. 
I definitely didn’t win the cases because of my oral 
arguments. My clients won the cases because, on the law, they 
deserved to win. I just went along for the ride, but it was a great 
ride.
